Florida State’s decision to move on from athletic director Michael Alford may eventually strengthen its NIL operation, modernize the athletic department and give the football program even more financial firepower.
But more money cannot be treated as the cure for every problem, not when Florida State has already produced some of the ACC’s worst results with one of its most expensive rosters.
Because college football’s financial system remains remarkably opaque, roster-spending figures should be viewed as informed estimates rather than audited payrolls. They can include direct revenue sharing, collective payments and outside NIL agreements.
Even with that necessary disclaimer, the industry consensus is difficult to ignore.
The Athletic’s estimated spending graphic places Florida State around $24 million, behind only Miami, Clemson and Virginia Tech in the ACC. A separate Sports Illustrated survey of more than 40 industry insiders similarly placed FSU in the group immediately behind Miami alongside Clemson, Louisville and SMU.
The exact number can be debated. Florida State’s position among the ACC’s better-resourced programs cannot. Neither can the results.
Top-tier resources, bottom-tier results
Florida State finished 17th in the ACC in 2024, going 1-7 in conference play and 2-10 overall. In 2025, the Seminoles improved only marginally, finishing tied for 13th at 2-6 in the conference and 5-7 overall.
After opening the 2026 ACC schedule with another loss to SMU, Mike Norvell is now 8-18 overall and 3-14 against conference opponents since the beginning of 2024.
According to the ACC’s official standings, Duke and Pitt both finished 6-2 in conference play last season. Duke won the ACC championship. In the current spending estimate, both programs sit among the bottom five in the league.
That is not a perfect apples-to-apples comparison because the graphic estimates 2026 roster costs while those standings reflect the 2025 season. It does, however, disprove the idea that spending near the top of the ACC is required to produce competitive results.
Manny Diaz and Pat Narduzzi produced three times as many conference victories as Norvell with programs operating under considerably tighter financial limitations.
FSU did not need Miami’s reported $40 million-plus roster to avoid finishing near the bottom of the conference. It needed to maximize the resources it already had.
The spending problem is also an allocation problem
The question is not simply how much Florida State has spent. It is what Norvell and his personnel operation have received in return.
Quarterback provides the clearest example.
After Jordan Travis’ injury ended the 2023 season, FSU built three consecutive teams around veteran transfer quarterbacks: DJ Uiagalelei in 2024, Tommy Castellanos in 2025 and Ashton Daniels in 2026.
Norvell’s first two post-Travis portal quarterback decisions resulted in consecutive losing seasons. Uiagalelei completed 53.8% of his passes with four touchdowns and six interceptions before an injury ended his FSU career. Castellanos produced better numbers, but the Seminoles still went 5-7 and failed to win a road game.
Florida State then chose Daniels for another make-or-break season.
FSU hosted more expensive options, including DJ Lagway and Anthony Colandrea, among the other quarterbacks considered, before settling on Daniels. Published NIL figures are valuations, not confirmed salaries, but reporting on FSU’s roster strategy placed Daniels around $1 million while other available quarterbacks carried valuations closer to $2+ million.
The most defensible conclusion is not that Florida State refused every quarterback’s asking price; those negotiations are private. It is that the staff chose a lower-cost approach at the sport’s most important position despite possessing an upper-tier ACC roster budget.
The early return has been concerning. Against SMU, Daniels completed 12 of 23 passes for only 125 yards as FSU generated 324 total yards and converted 2 of 15 third downs. The Seminoles forced four turnovers and still lost at home.
Saving money at quarterback is not responsible roster management if the savings are not producing greater value elsewhere. There is no better example than FSU’s biggest rival sitting in South Florida.
The Hurricanes took the opposite approach, electing to pay up for top-tier quarterbacks (Cam Ward, Carson Beck and now Darian Mensah), and the results have paid off, no pun intended. Miami has a combined record of 25-6 with those three at the helm compared to FSU’s 8-18.
What makes this even more puzzling is the fact that FSU’s newly hired General Manager, who came from Duke after they won their first ACC Championship since 1962, largely in part because they reportedly paid $4 million for Mensah, decided they did not want to get into expensive quarterback waters in Tallahassee. So, the exact formula that worked at one stop was not feasible at the next? It’s a decision that doesn’t add up to me.
I am not saying FSU needs to, or has the money to pay what Miami is spending at the position. However, repeatedly going back to the bargain bin at the most important position in football and getting similar results is even more confusing.
Paying for players who do not contribute
The same questions extend beyond quarterback.
Florida State added UNC transfer receiver Gavin Blackwell before the 2025 season. Norvell praised his experience, route-running, and versatility, but Blackwell appeared in only four games and finished his lone season at FSU without recording a reception. His exact compensation was never publicly confirmed, but the program still devoted a roster spot and resources to a veteran transfer who provided no statistical return.
This year, FSU added former Texas running back Tre Wisner, whose public NIL valuation was approximately $650,000. Through two games, he has four carries for 34 yards and three receptions for four yards. He did not play a snap against SMU despite not appearing on the final availability report.
Wisner could still become a contributor, and two games are far too early to declare the addition a failure. The issue is the roster-building logic. FSU invested significantly at a position where Ousmane Kromah and Samuel Singleton Jr. were already capable options while entering the season with major concerns at quarterback and along the offensive line.
That does not look like a program with no money. It looks like one that has not consistently allocated its money well.
The head coach owns the return
It is fair to question whether Alford placed limitations on NIL fundraising or prevented Florida State from operating as aggressively as its peers. The school clearly believes its athletic structure must change, which is why Alford is no longer the athletic director.
A new AD may create a stronger organization, expand the available budget and improve how FSU navigates the rapidly changing financial landscape.
That still does not absolve the head coach.
Norvell has selected the players, constructed the roster, chosen the quarterbacks and overseen multiple coaching-staff rebuilds. He has been given enough talent and financial support to produce far more than three ACC victories in 17 attempts.
Florida State does not need to lead the country in spending to avoid finishing 17th in its own conference. It does not need a $40 million roster to win more ACC games than Duke or Pitt. It does not need another explanation for why a highly compensated coaching staff has delivered bottom-tier results with upper-tier resources.
The Seminoles should continue raising money. They should improve NIL operations. They should build a modern personnel department and give their next athletic director every tool necessary to compete nationally.
But the first step in maximizing Florida State’s resources is putting those resources in the hands of someone who can turn them into wins.
Changing athletic directors was a start. It should not be the end.